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The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship 





The idea of market citizenship is often invoked in discourse on EU citizenship, but usually in 
order to suggest that EU citizenship should not be conceptualised in this way. The dominant 
argument sees market citizenship as a vestige of history, and contends that EU citizenship has 
now evolved beyond its primitive roots into a more substantial (typically, more state-like) 
bond.1 The transmutation is sometimes evidenced by the reduction in meaningfulness of 
economic self-sufficiency as a precondition for EU legal protection of those who move to (or 
between) and/or reside in Member States other than the State of their nationality.2 The 
complexities of transnational citizenship have also generated thoughtful and original ways of 
characterising its development over time.3  
 Others argue that even this evolved ‘something’ is less than what citizenship (in 
normative terms) requires, needs, or deserves; that the EU generates a version of pseudo-
citizenship at best, draping a thin veil of self-serving rhetoric over its formative and enduring 
economic ancestry. In other words, even if EU citizenship does now mean ‘more’, something 
achieved mainly through a process of legal substantiation, that does not necessarily imply 
that it yet means ‘enough’. Staying with the example of self-sufficiency, the supporting claim 
here would question the retention of any economic preconditions at all and argue for stronger 
                                                          
∗ School of Law, University of Edinburgh. This research was supported by funding from the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council (AHRC), and by the Law Department at the European University 
Institute, Florence. Thanks, with the usual proviso, to Christian Joerges, Neil Walker and Stephen 
Weatherill; and to Michael Dougan and Graeme Laurie. 
1 E.g. D Kostakopoulou, ‘Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change’ 
(2005) 68 MLR 233 at 233-234. 
2 E.g. para. 54 of AG Mazák’s Opinion in Case C-158/07 Förster v IB-Groep [2008] ECR I-8507: ‘It is thus 
fair to say that the concept of Union citizenship, as developed by the case-law of the Court, marks a 
process of emancipation of Community rights from their economic paradigm … Community law rights 
– in particular the right not to be subjected to unjustified discrimination – are no longer bestowed upon 
citizens solely when they make use of the economic freedoms and assume a corresponding status 
(worker, provider of services etc.), but directly by virtue of their status as a citizen of the Union.’ The 
financial resources and medical insurance conditions that curb movement and residence rights are set 
out mainly in Articles 7 and 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States, 2004 OJ L158/7. 
3 E.g. T Faist, ‘Social citizenship in the European Union: Nested membership’ (2001) 39 JCMS 37; K 
Nicolaïdis, ‘The new constitution as European “demoi-cracy”?’ (2004) 7 Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy 76; D Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union citizenship: Writing the future’ 
(2007) 13 ELJ 623; A Somek, Individualism: An Essay on the Authority of the European Union, (OUP, 2008). 
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host State obligations to grant social assistance to migrant EU nationals. Underlying some of 
these arguments, there is perhaps also a suspicion that, even with the best of intentions, the 
EU as a polity is intrinsically debarred from generating real citizenship, because that 
relationship is more properly or even uniquely the preserve of states. This is not just a 
critique of the EU as citizenship-worthy, but a questioning of whether it is even citizenship-
capable.  
The argument developed in this article falls somewhere in between the two positions. 
It seeks to unpick the normative and legal qualities of EU citizenship on an empirical basis, 
and argues that it has not (yet) evolved beyond a market citizenship construction. EU 
citizenship is a deeply contested concept and the danger with developing any arguments 
grounded in market citizenship is that the very connotation sparks reflexive rejection. We 
want to move away from market associations; we strive to show that we have done so. As the 
EU matures in polity-terms, scholarship seeking to articulate its citizenship has flourished; 
but then, approaches inevitably diverge.  
Michelle Everson’s benchmark exploration of EU market citizenship remains one of 
the few studies framed expressly around these questions. Distinguishing the ‘market citizen’ 
and the ‘Union citizen’, she outlined the ‘intended contrast’ between these two archetypes 
notwithstanding the ‘core of the new concept [being the] same right of mobility’.4 Adopting a 
clear chronological split between the eras of market and Union citizenship,5 she argued that 
market citizenship in general is inherently limited. Critically, however, she did this by tracing 
the market citizen’s profile ‘in the national setting [as] a subsidiary role which citizens proper 
were expected to play’.6  
This article is not suggesting that EU citizenship is ‘destined’, to paraphrase the 
Court, only and ever to remain a form of market citizenship. But drawing from both the 
nature of the EU as a polity and the substance of EU citizenship as it has actually developed 
within the paradigm of EU law, it argues that both the reality – and scope – of transnational 
market citizenship may offer more than we tend to presume. It is at least one valid and 
credible way of capturing how EU citizenship has developed in reality and of 
accommodating at least some aspects of its continued deepening. Normative understandings 
                                                          
4 M Everson, ‘The legacy of the market citizen’, in J Shaw and G More (eds.) New Legal Dynamics of 
European Union, (Clarendon Press, 1995) 73 at 73. 
5 E.g. ‘[t]he central issue [of the chapter will be] whether the concept of the market citizen has created 
any particular problems which require urgent attention (or correction) via the medium of the institution 
of the Union citizen’ (ibid., 74). 
6 Ibid., 87 (emphasis added). For discussion of literature criticising the status of the state-market citizen, 
see esp. 84-85. 
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and expectations of EU citizenship have clearly progressed beyond state-rooted ideas of 
market citizenship. But has the substance of EU citizenship actually exceeded the frame of a 
complex transnational market? The article also argues that political thickening of EU 
citizenship has not, to date, undermined the market citizenship assertion. The Treaties and 
innumerable institutional statements can repeatedly tell us that the citizen is at the heart of 
the European project; but that is not enough to make it so. 
 After a brief discussion on the nature of the EU as a polity, the qualities of the 
transnational market sited within that polity will be outlined. The possibilities afforded by 
market citizenship are thus strongly contextualised within the particularities of the EU and, 
especially, its constitutionally enriched legal order. This leads to the claim that market 
citizenship, understood from this specific perspective, might still be an appropriate and 
legitimate descriptor of EU citizenship. The continuing significance of free movement rights is 
another critical factor in this characterisation. The growing impact of developments beyond 
free movement law is recognised to a certain extent, but the argument stops short of 
construing this as an equally-paced alchemic reaction in social and political terms.  
 The article thus advances a more ambitious profile for market citizenship but a more 
modest view of EU citizenship – for now, at least – than is usually presented. It will be 
acknowledged that we may be standing at the threshold of fundamental change just now, 
facing the prospect of a genuinely transformative phase in the evolution of EU citizenship. 
Thus, whether EU market citizenship does turn out to be a transitional formation, albeit of 
longer duration than is normally accepted, remains to be seen. 
 
II. EU Citizenship and the Polity Impact  
 
Analyses of EU citizenship often address what citizenship either brings to or says about the 
nature of the EU as a polity. The starting point here raises the inverse question instead: how 
does the nature of the EU as a polity inherently condition ‘its’ citizenship?  
The language of citizenship is essentially one of membership (and, conversely, of 
non-membership or exclusion). It draws from discourse on democracy, participation and 
contribution; politics and constitutionalism; rights or entitlements; and reciprocal obligations 
or duties. There is an unsettled question about whether or not it also has an emotional 
dimension, moving the language of citizenship into (self-)perception, loyalty, and belonging 
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(not far removed from the concept of nationality).7 Reflections on citizenship are also 
powerfully shaped by ideological and philosophical influences. For example, commentators 
engage communitarian or liberal or republican values when prescribing or assessing the 
relationship between a polity and its citizens.8 The relationship between and proportional 
importance attached to these elements is typically contested, however; there is no universal 
definition and citizenship is inevitably contextualised – in other words, there can be versions 
of citizenship, within which different elements are highlighted, configured or emphasised in 
different ways, to explain different social and historical contexts, or to fit different ideological 
or philosophical perspectives. Through this manoeuvring, the concept of citizenship acquires 
not just contexts, but also a series of framing adjectives – market citizenship, political 
citizenship, cultural citizenship, social citizenship, and so on.9 The selection and attachment 
of adjectives can be loaded with meaning, preference and expectation – and can also bring 
about negative associations. 
 Our experience and expectations of contemporary citizenship have emerged mainly 
through centuries of citizenship practice within the paradigm of states. But that polity 
connection is circumstantial. It has been essential, of course; but it is neither necessarily nor 
irrevocably written into citizenship’s genetic code. Whether it was an attempt to capture or 
manufacture a relationship between the EU and Member State nationals, the choice of 
‘citizenship’ at Maastricht as the centre of gravity for Articles 20-25 TFEU brought with it 
state-citizenship’s primeval narrative of meaning, ideology, and expectation – though, again, 
it would be more accurate to say meanings, ideologies and expectations. A perennial question 
in the EU context is whether a legitimate or accepted form of citizenship can be re-imagined 
in the context of a non-state polity. This is not the same thing as trying to avoid state-based 
comparisons just because they throw up difficult or uncomfortable conceptual obstacles. The 
rejection of EU citizenship as a form of market citizenship on the grounds of the latter’s 
diminution as a sufficient or valuable status within states is, rather, incomplete. 
 In one of the earliest extensive studies on EU citizenship from a legal perspective, 
O’Leary developed a working definition that enables us to reflect on both the relative 
elemental looseness of citizenship and its having a fundamental essence. She considered 
citizenship to be ‘a juridical condition which describes membership of and participation in a 
                                                          
7 See S O’Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: From the Free Movement of Persons to Union 
Citizenship, (Kluwer Law International, 1996) 4-13. 
8 See ‘Introduction: From national to transnational citizenship’ to R. Bellamy, D Castiglione and J. Shaw 
(eds.), Making European Citizens (Palgrave, 2006) 1-28. 
9 Much of this is built on the foundational work of T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, (CUP, 
1950). 
 5 
defined community or state [carrying] with it a number of rights and duties which are, in 
themselves, an expression of the political and legal link between the state and the 
individual.’10 Using this definition, it is similarly accepted here that the EU is citizenship-
capable. In the next two sections, this general understanding of citizenship is developed in 
the particular context of the EU polity. 
 
A. The EU polity: constitutionally strong, politically challenged 
 
The EU is a necessary and effective expert in middle management, sitting between the 
transnational interests of its Member States and the external global concerns that it 
increasingly navigates on their behalf. When we think about entities positioned, in broad 
terms, alongside the EU (e.g. the European Economic Area or the World Trade Organisation), 
we know instinctively that the idea of EEA or WTO citizens is absurd. What is it about the EU 
that begets the credible possibility of EU citizens? The answer to this seems rooted in the 
comparatively complex machinery wrapped around the EU, in those particular features that 
make it a polity, distinguishing it from these other ‘organisations’.  
 A polity is defined here as a formalised and recognised unit having political, 
constitutional and economic elements.11 The EU exhibits all of these characteristics. But, like 
the versions of citizenship suggested above, it does not exhibit them in an equally weighted 
sense. Moreover, the EU does not have to exhibit them in the same way as a state does. It may 
be more accurate to describe the EU as having economic, constitutional and political depth in 
that (reverse) order. This then maps onto the consequential polity conditioning of EU 
citizenship, which in turn strongly suggests a market character.  
 The EU is clearly a dynamic polity, in that it is a project under continuous construction. 
Significant changes in its make-up and functions over time have not been linear. They have 
occurred partly through deliberate choices of the Member States; but also partly organically, 
and often through creative interpretation of the boundaries of the Treaties by the Court of 
Justice. Even here, though, the acquiescence of the States plays a critical legitimating part. 
This introduces, second, the EU as a symbiotic polity. While it resembles a federal state in many 
                                                          
10 O’ Leary, n7 above, 13. 
11 The idea of a polity is used here in terms of denoting an existential depth rather than the Aristotelian 
exposition, which related to the status and authority structures of the Greek city and was woven around 
more specific community-oriented features or requirements. A helpful symmetry between the EU as a 
polity in contemporary terms and the city as a polity in historical terms, however, is that having the 
characteristics of a polity is a necessary precondition for the generation of a legitimate citizenship 
relationship. In other words, organisations cannot have citizens; but polities – and not, therefore, only 
states – can. I am grateful to Claudio Michelon for discussion on this point. 
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ways, it is not one.12 It remains dependent on the Member States for its outline shape; for the 
attribution of its competences and the design of its institutions; and, ultimately, for its 
continued existence. Significantly, this is expressly reflected in the complementarity of its 
transnational citizenship – rephrased as additional-ity in Article 20(1) TFEU.13 Third, the EU 
is very obviously a transnational polity.   
Before addressing the economic dimension separately in section B below, it was 
noted above that constitutional and political elements also contribute to the formation of 
legitimate polities. Drawing from a commonly applied distinction, ‘constitutional’ is used 
here to mean the law-framing structure of a polity and ‘political’ refers to its law-making 
processes. In the context of a state, these elements are very obviously linked i.e. there are 
evident constitutional and political dimensions to both law-framing and law-making debates. 
There is a widely perceived separateness and indeed unevenness of the two in the EU, 
however – in other words, the EU as a polity is typically considered to be constitutionally 
advanced but, thinking especially of critiques on democracy deficits and legitimacy gaps, it is 
much more exposed in political terms.14  
 The classic standoff about whether the primacy of EU law takes effect because the 
Court of Justice says so or because of the tolerance of national courts and parliaments is a 
classic example of the first-principles uncertainty that still characterises EU constitutional 
questions.15 But it is accepted nonetheless that the EU is a constitutional polity – or, at least, a 
polity to which constitutional principles quickly became attached.16 That debate sub-divides 
into ‘big C/small c’ constitutionalism,17 reflecting the distinction between self-conscious, 
Treaty-destined constitutional ambition and the more amorphous evolution of extra-Treaty 
                                                          
12 For a recent thesis on the EU as a ‘federation of states’, see R Schütze, ‘On “federal” ground: The 
European Union as an (inter)national phenomenon’ (2009) 46 CMLRev 1069.  
13 The conceptual value of complementary citizenship (especially against the thinness of transnational 
welfare solidarity to date) is discussed in R Bellamy, ‘The liberty of the post-moderns? Market and civic 
freedom within the EU’, LEQS paper No. 01/2009, at 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/LEQSPapers.aspx 
14 See, for example, Y Meny, ‘De la démocratie en Europe: Old concepts and new challenges’ (2003) 41 
JCMS 1; A Føllesdal and S Hix, ‘Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and 
Moravcsik (2006) 44 JCMS 533. 
15 The debate on EU constitutional pluralism is a burgeoning limb of this question: See N MacCormick, 
‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 MLR 1; N Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 
MLR 317; M Poaires Maduro, ‘Europe and the Constitution: What if this is as good as it gets?’, in JHH 
Weiler and M Wind (eds.), Constitutionalism Beyond the State, (CUP, 2003) 74; J Baquero Cruz, ‘The 
Legacy of the Maastrich-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement’ (2008) 14 ELJ 389; and G Davies, 
‘Constitutional disagreement in Europe and the search for pluralism’, Eric Stein Working Paper No. 
1/2010, available at http://www.ericsteinpapers.eu/papers/2010/1.html. 
16 See J Hunt and J Shaw, ‘Fairy Tale of Luxembourg? Reflection on Law and Legal Scholarship in 
European Integration’ in D. Phinnemore and A. Warleigh (eds) Reflections on European Integration: 50 
Years of the Treaty of Rome (Palgrave, 2009), 93. 
17 N Walker, ‘Big “C” or small “c”?’ (2006) 12 ELJ 12. 
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constitutional’ism’ through case law.18 In national settings, constitutions emerge from 
political processes – usually, political storms. In the EU context, constitutionalism emerged by 
stealth –by law, with the Court of Justice as the chief hero-villain.19 The legitimating quality of 
law itself offers some degree of authority here.20 But it is not enough properly to explain the 
profundity of the original leap to constitutionalism or its amplification since then. If any 
suspension of disbelief is called for, it is not because of the substance of landmark 
constitutional judgments.21 It is more that they were allowed to take root and then to inform 
subsequent decisions in both EU and national courts; that crisis talks were not rashly 
convened after van Gend en Loos to collapse this auto-referential ‘new’ legal order.  
So the States may not have started the process of EU constitutionalism through 
political routes, but they allowed it to happen – and to continue. Partly, the ‘mythical 
neutrality and religious-like authority with which we invest our supreme courts’22 saved EU 
constitutional discourse; and partly, because deconstruction of the EEC would have been not 
only politically messy23 but also politically traumatic, given post-War determination to 
progress the idea and potential of the new Communities.  
 It has also been significant that conversations about constitutionalism/law-framing 
and politics/law-making have tended to be parallel rather than appropriately overlapping or 
joined-up, often because of disciplinary boundaries within EU scholarship. The law-making 
institutional structure of the EU is perceived, furthermore, to emancipate national (and 
supranational) politicians from familiar State-like checks and balances, accentuating 
                                                          
18 For recent, Lisbon-inclusive discussion of both narratives, see J Shaw, ‘Citizenship: Contrasting 
dynamics at the interface of integration and constitutionalism’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds.) The 
Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2010, forthcoming).  
19 The foundational decisions on direct effect, primacy and a system of State liability for breaches of 
Community law include Case 26/62 Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1; Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585; Joined 
Cases C-46 and 48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur v Germany and R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factorame [1996] ECR I-1029. Another important example is the jurisprudence on EU recognition and 
protection of fundamental rights, stemming initially from one terse statement in Case 29/69 Stauder v 
City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419 and triggering ultimately the political development of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
20 See Hunt and Shaw, n16 above, for critique of key scholarship on this point. 
21 On the ‘undeniable coherence’ of this constitutional progression, see JHH. Weiler, ‘The transformation 
of Europe’ (1990-1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403 at 2524-5. 
22 Weiler, ibid., 2428; for others, however, the ‘spectre of judicial supremacy’ might be a more 
appropriate characterisation (see O. Gerstenberg, ‘Expanding the constitution beyond the Court: The 
case of Euro-constitutionalism’ (2002) 8 ELJ 175 at 177). 
23 See M Shapiro, ‘The European Court of Justice’, in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 321 at 329. For an analysis of Advocate General, 
Commission and Member State influence on the Court in the period of its formative constitutional case 
law, see E Stein, ‘Lawyers, judges and the making of a transnational constitution’ (1981) 75 American 
Journal of International Law 1. 
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democracy and legitimacy concerns. In seeking to correct the course and content of EU 
constitutional and political narratives, plotting ‘European’ democracy and legitimacy along 
state tracks has also been problematic.24 This involves an admission that the EU actually does 
break the mould25 and that ‘all democracies suffer from some kind of deficit’.26  
 It must also be remembered that EU institutional design is uniquely oriented to its 
transnational make-up and functions; and that genuine institutional reform (especially of the 
European Parliament) has been vigorously dynamic through each phase of Treaty revision.27 
The symbiotic nature of the polity also has a particular contribution to make here. Political 
legitimacy and democratic credentials are vital questions for the EU, and so they should be. 
But the elements of its dependency on the States that still exist can, do, and perhaps could 
more consciously be recognised to draw from their political legitimacy and democratic 
credentials too.28 Now, Article 10 TEU emphasises precisely these mixed ways in which 
citizens are politically represented, both directly and indirectly, in the processes of EU 
decision-making.  
 The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights provides an interesting 
way for us to think about this, drawing from its decisions on how EU Member States must 
observe their ECHR responsibilities in the construction and supervision of the EU, centred in 
particular on their unique capacity to exercise Treaty-making competence.29 The Member 
States may transfer authority for the delivery of certain outputs to the EU, but they still ‘own’ 
those competences and they infuse (and should be recognised as infusing) that transfer with 
their own political credibility. Not all of the political shortcomings faced by the EU can be 
                                                          
24 Meny characterises the harshness of the democratic deficit debate as ‘a kind of mystery…given that, 
after all, the democratic credentials of Europe do not appear so distant, in practice, from those of 
democracies at the national level’ (n14 above, 8; emphasis added). This remark has added resonance in 
the current era of executive primacy, irrespective of what kind of polity is being discussed.  
25 Conjuring the sui generis idea; see, for example,. Della Scala and A Wiener, ‘Constitution making and 
citizenship practice: Bridging the democracy gap in the EU?’, Sussex European Institute (SEI) Working 
Paper No. 18, 9-11; C Joerges, ‘The law in the process of constitutionalizing Europe’, EUI Working 
Paper, Law, No. 2002/4, http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/handle/1814/182, 6-9; N Walker, ‘Constitutionalism 
and Pluralism in Global Context’, in M Avbelj and J Komarek (eds.) Constitutional Pluralism in the 
European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing, 2010, forthcoming). 
26  Meny, n14 above, 9. 
27 The potential offered by the new citizens’ initiative is discussed further below; see Articles 11(4) TEU 
and 24 TFEU. 
28 See A Menon and S Weatherill, ‘Transnational legitimacy in a globalising world: How the European 
Union rescues its States’ (2008) 31 West European Politics 397. See also, the attempts of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court to grapple with these questions (albeit from a State-favoured bias) in its 
Lisbon Treaty decision, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, judgment of 30 June 2009; for analysis and critique, see D 
Doukas, ‘The Verdict of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty: Not Guilty, but 
Don’t Do it Again!’ (2009) 34 ELRev 866.   
29 Matthews v United Kingdom (App. 24833/94; (1999) 28 EHRR 361) and Bosphorus Airways v Ireland (App. 
45036/98; (2006) 42 EHRR 1). 
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resolved in this way but some of them certainly can. This suggests a more nuanced 
disjuncture between the complex constitutional scheme of the EU, developed through its 
relatively autonomous system of legal integration, and its less worked-out, or at least more 
ambiguous, political scaffold.  
 Meanwhile, the day-to-day business of the EU carries on,30 and the de facto acceptance 
of EU constitutionalism enables its persistence. Whether or not this is accepted as legitimate 
in normative terms, it has proven durably to be enough – at least until it no longer is. Joerges 
incisively captures the ultimate flaw in our illusion: ‘[t]his tenacity of the European polity is 
reassuring, but no more than that. It does not, after all, guarantee that the incremental 
searching and learning process whereby Europe has “constituted” itself can successfully 
continue.’31 While the illusion continues and thereby hardens, the ‘constitutionally 
advanced/politically unusual’ model conditions the nature of the EU as a polity – delivering 
and supporting, in turn, a more deeply constitutional than political version of EU citizenship. 
We turn now to joining this up with the market. 
 
B. EU constitutionalism and the EU market 
  
No polity, constitutional or otherwise, exists just for the sake of existence. ‘What’ is grounded 
in constitutionalism is the substantive point. And what the EU constitutionalises is a 
framework within which functions, primarily, a market.   
 Whether in a state or non-state context, the progression from market to (any kind of) 
polity is by no means inevitable.32 It happens through deliberate political and legal as well as 
economic choices both at the time of formation, as/if affirmed since then. Article 3(3) TEU 
reaffirms the significance of the market within the aims and tasks of the Union. This provision 
also highlights the complexity of the EU internal market, framing it in a range of cultural, 
economic, environmental, political and social objectives. Article 26 TFEU (ex 14 EC) is a 
significant provision of untapped potential with its simple yet sweeping and far-reaching 
                                                          
30 See similarly, C Joerges, ‘The market without the state? The “economic constitution” of the European 
Community and the rebirth of regulatory politics’, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), vol. 1 
(1997), no. 19; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-019a.htm, 5; and ‘What is left of the European Economic 
Constitution?’, EUI Working Paper, Law, No. 2004/13, http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/handle/1814/2828, 
35-6. 
31 C. Joerges, n25 above, 34. 
32 As MacCormick observes, ‘[c]ivil liberty is favourable to markets, and markets are favourable to civil 
liberty…neither is strictly essential to the other’ (N MacCormick, ‘Spontaneous order and the rule of 
law: Some problems’ (1989) 2 Ratio Juris 41, 45); similarly, A Evans, ‘Union citizenship and the 
constitutionalization of equality in EU law’, in M. La Torre (ed.), European Citizenship: An Institutional 
Challenge (Kluwer Law International, 1998) 267 at 272.  
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definition of the EU internal market as ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’. Baquero Cruz has observed, 
outwith the context of the recent Treaty reform process but with strong resonance for it, that 
the bias in reform debates is ‘focused on formal or institutional changes [but the] debate on 
other possible direct and desired changes…in the economic orientation of the Community is 
simply not taking place.’33 In other words, the direction and significance of the internal 
market have been detached from the political debate; both its functioning and flaws are 
largely taken for granted, as if an intra-state market on this scale was the natural way of 
things. But it is not. Writing for the Commission in 1996, Monti observed that ‘the single 
market remains politically centre-stage as a key instrument thought which the priorities of the 
Union can be delivered.’34 This is not expressed so much these days; in fact, we seem to come 
up with every reason but the market to justify the continued existence and development of 
the EU.35 
 The deeper constitutional force underpinning the market is often touched on in the 
literature.36 Three main strands of scholarship explore the implications of that link more 
comprehensively. First, there is the debate about whether the EU is or is not a state, or how 
closely it can be said to resemble one.37 The typical line of inquiry here looks to institutional 
                                                          
33 J Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement (Hart Publishing, 2002) 84. 
34 M. Monti, The Single Market and Tomorrow’s Europe: A Progress Report from the European Commission 
(Kogan Page, 1996) 144. 
35 The deceptive neutrality of progressing integration through the market is exemplified by the quiet but 
profound political and constitutional changes effected by the 1985 White Paper and the SEA (European 
Commission, ‘Completing the Internal Market’ – COM (85) 310 final; its omni-sedative effects are 
described by Weiler, n21 above, 2457). There are some signs of revitalised market debate at the time of 
writing; after its distinctly underwhelming vision of a Single market for the 21st century (COM(2007) 724 
final), the Commission subsequently invited former Commissioner Monti to prepare a comprehensive 
report on the single market, the central theme of which consistently emphasises the importance of the 
market to EU integration more broadly (M Monti, A New Strategy for the Single Market: At the service of 
Europe’s Economy and Society, 9 May 2010, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf). 
36 For example, Chalmers points to ‘evidence of an express link between the single market and the 
normative qualities of the Community legal order’ (D Chalmers, ‘The single market: From prima donna 
to journeyman’, in J Shaw and G More (eds.) New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon Press, 
1995) 55, 60); Reich refers to the ‘economic rights [which] were to form and in fact still constitute the 
central point of [the EC] constitution’ (N Reich, ‘A European constitution for citizens: Reflections on the 
rethinking of Union and Community law’ (1997) 3 ELJ 131, 142); Maduro notes the ‘interplay between 
the constitutionalisation of Community law and market integration rules’ (M Maduro, We, The Court: 
The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) 8); 
and Weiler describes the common market as ‘the heart of the material or substantive constitution of the 
Community’ but, significantly, he continues that this ‘is, too, an important part of overall European 
constitutionalism’ (JHH Weiler, ‘The constitution of the common market place: Text and context in the 
evolution of the free movement of goods’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, 
(OUP, 1999), 349 at 350; see also 363). 
37 See again, Schütze, n12 above, 1105. 
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structures and related principles, but the fusion of constitution and market does sometimes 
feature, predominantly in comparative recourse to the development of US constitutionalism 
and its construction of the ‘earliest common market in existence’.38 Writing about the nascent 
American polity, James Bryce’s work on constitution-market linkages is remarkably prescient 
of the eventual EU experience – especially where he points to the political weakness that can 
slip through a framework which overemphasises constitutional and market strength.39 A 
second debate relates to polarised claims about mutual degradation i.e. that the digestion of 
non-market interests thwarts optimum market liberalisation; or that Union constitutionalism 
is unduly shaped by market influences.40 These questions have strong resonance for the view 
that ‘real’ citizenship should not be similarly tied the market adjective.  
Finally, a third debate exploring constitutional-market linkages relates to the 
influence and/or waning of the theory of the economic constitution. This scholarship looks 
primarily at the boundaries of institutional regulation along the social fault-lines of the 
market, drawing heavily from the ‘constitutional messages’ of German ordoliberal 
scholarship.41 Despite terminological proximity, the constitutional market iused in this article 
does not seek to exploit a ‘type’ of constitutionalism as a market tool in the same way. It is 
more about realising constitutional doctrine around and within the framework and 
functioning of a market. It is more than ‘economy as polity’.42 As Harden notes, ‘[e]conomic 
relationships are important, but cannot provide the sole foundation of a constitution.’43 The 
mixed intentions that have always fed into the Union ensured that the market was never 
going to be its sole foundation. Both the EU constitution and the EU market have independent 
                                                          
38 AJ Mackenzie Stuart, ‘Problems of the European Community: Transatlantic parallels’ (1987) 36 ICLQ 
183 at 188. More generally, see K Armstrong and S Bulmer, The Governance of the Single European Market 
(Manchester University Press, 1998) 46 et seq. 
39 J Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, (OUP, 1901), Essay IV, ‘The action of centripetal and 
centrifugal forces on political constitutions’, 216, 249. See further, D Edward, ‘Thinking about 
constitutions’, Federal Trust European Essay No 34, available at 
http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/Essays/Essay_34.pdf. 
40 E.g. the extensive commentary reacting to Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child 
(SPUC) v Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685; Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v 
Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609; and Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Eyggnadsarbetareförbundets avd. 1, Byggettan, Svenska 
Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767.  
41 Joerges, n30 above’, 13; see that paper generally for an overview of the origins and development of 
ordoliberalism. While democratic legitimacy was always centred on private market actors in the original 
theoretical framework, contemporary debate discusses whether more formalised methods of (less-legal) 
governance can be accommodated in economic constitutionalism. See also, I Harden, ‘The constitution 
of the European Union’ (1994) Public Law 609 and M Everson, ‘Adjudicating the market’ (2002) 8 ELJ 
151. 
42 Joerges, n30 above, 30 (emphasis in the original). 
43 Harden, n41 above, 620. 
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purpose and significance, and independent strength. But in joining them, the Union acquires 
added force as a citizenship-capable polity. 
 The assertion that an internal market remains pivotal for the project of European 
integration should not be taken as a normative claim about the inherent or unique worthiness 
or otherwise of markets, about their place in contemporary global governance, or about the 
extent to which they should or should not be regulated. Those debates are real, and pressing, 
but they are not resolved here. Rather, the claim is more modest: a statement of ‘is’ more than 
‘ought’ in casting the internal market as the historical and continuing heartbeat of the EU. The 
EU exists to encourage, secure, engineer and develop intensive forms of transnational 
cooperation. The EU also remains a resolute architect of borders; simultaneously dissolving 
internal borders but hardening external ones. The market is a vitally important means 
through which those ideas are realised. This does not mean that the EU is not more than a 
market too; but it does suggest that the EU exists primarily to deliver a market – albeit a 
complex transnational market that is trying to find its way among and make a contribution to 
challenges of global (re)distribution. Its management of trade has evolved over time to site 
‘trade’ in changing political and geographical, internal and external contexts.  
A constitutional market does not presume crude victory for the economic values or 
vices of the market-place. Rather, constitutionalism requires (not just allows) a more nuanced 
market to take shape. Crucially, this can also be reflected onto a more nuanced construction of 
market citizenship. It was observed at the outset that market citizenship is almost always 
used to describe the immature beginnings of EU citizenship, to capture a point in its 
evolution that is something to be or already left behind – as it was within the paradigm of 
states. But the personality of a market citizen – not a state-based market citizen – is 
necessarily shaped by the qualities of the market in question and by the demands that the 
citizen needs to make on that polity (and vice versa). EU citizenship has been principally 
substantiated, so far, by consolidating and building upon legal rights that relate almost 
exclusively to transnational movement. Emphasising the polity/citizen link, it follows that 
more fundamental transfiguration of EU citizenship demands fundamental change of the EU 
as a polity too. Some examples of transformative events that would profoundly alter both EU 
citizenship and the EU polity, its relationship to the States and the constitutional rulebooks of 
all of these polities, will be addressed in part III.  
While it seems counter-intuitive, a theory of market citizenship actually takes 
seriously the call to put the person at the centre of the EU project. In accordance with the 
express instruction in Article 20 TFEU, it is focused on the added value that transnational 
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citizenship is asked to deliver and thereby enables EU citizenship to unfold on its own terms. 
It relies less on synthetic or premature understandings of transnational ‘identity’ or ‘loyalty’ 
and reflects organic development through the issues and situations that citizens have brought 
forward for supranational adjudication (though see the discussion in part III on the 
problematic question of enforcement more generally). The case law also suggests that there 
are more rights available within a market framework than those that find purely economic 
expression.44  
So it is not that market citizenship must inherently fall short but rather, that we tend 
artificially to constrain the capacity of the market and to overlook the normative as well as 
economic capacity of a constitutional market. The constitutional frame brings structural 
advantages too: the primacy of EU law, for example, ensures that when national rules or 
practices are found to contravene EU citizenship rights, the latter can be forced to prevail. 
Part III expands on some of these ideas in order to fill out the profile of the EU market citizen 
more comprehensively and empirically to justify the retention, for now, of the market 
adjective for EU citizenship.  
 
III. The Practice and Persistence of EU (Constitutional) Market Citizenship 
 
Long before the formalisation of EU citizenship through the Maastricht Treaty, an implicit 
stance of a citizenship nature, appreciating the humanity and complexity of free movement 
rights, was widely traceable in Community legislation45 and case law,46 and acknowledged in 
                                                          
44 The identity-grounded claims supported in Garcia Avello and the way in which their treatment 
differed from the earlier decision in Konstantinidis are illustrative here: cf. Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello v 
Belgian State [2003] ECR I-11613 and Case C-168/91 Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig, Standesamt, & 
Landratsamt Calw, Ordnungsamt [1993] ECR I-1191. See also, Case C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul v Grunkin-
Paul and Standesamt Stadt Niebüll [2008] ECR I-7639. The challenge that these cases pose for the driver of 
movement raises other questions, returned to in part III. 
45 The extension of Treaty protection to service recipients was a hugely significant step in free movement 
law, opening the way for claims from cross-border patients to tourists; see Directive 73/148, OJ 1973 
L172/14 (now repealed and replaced by Directive 2004/38/EC). Judicial affirmation and development of 
these principles, and the consequential decoupling of direct connection between the personal and 
material scope of the Treaty (especially in Case 186/87 Cowan v Trésor Public [1989] ECR 195) laid the 
analytical foundations for later case law on autonomous citizenship rights (notably Case C-85/96 
Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691). The 1990s Residence Directives also shifted emphasis 
away from occupational activities (Directives 90/364 (general movement and residence), 90/365 (retired 
persons) and 93/96 (students), OJ 1990 L180/26, L180/28 and OJ 1993 L317/59 respectively; all repealed 
and replaced by Directive 2004/38/EC). 
46 Though still tied to facilitation of ‘occupational activities’, there is an express reference to ‘Community 
citizens’ in Case 143/87 Stanton v Institut national d'assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants (Inasti) 
[1988] ECR 3877, para. 13. The was reaffirmed in Case C-370/90 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Singh, 
ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department [1992] ECR I-4265, para. 16, and sketched more 
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academic commentary.47 This work laid an irrefutable blueprint for contemporary EU 
citizenship law, in positive but also more limiting ways.48 The idea of European citizenship 
began to emerge also in the EU political forum (providing another example of legal/political 
conversations that were never properly joined up). There, we can trace growing emphasis on 
the role of the citizen in the pursuit of polity integration and appeals to more emotional 
features of citizenship, such as cultural and other forms of belonging and identity. The 
incremental evolution of citizenship through parallel legal/political processes resonates in 
several ways with the analogous discussion on the EU polity in part II above. First, the 
humanising of the person through E(E)C law was not an inevitable progression from the 
original Treaty provisions.49 It was instead a deliberate and recurring multi-institutional 
choice driven by different motivations, often connected more to progression of the polity than 
to protection of the individual. Second, describing this process in the language of citizenship 
was picked up not just by commentators looking in, but also by the institutional actors 
themselves. Third, there then began a process of the manipulation of citizenship to serve 
polity integration objectives.  
Interestingly, these ideas did not envisage value-added or complementary 
transnational citizenship, but drew instead from the paradigm of state membership.50 There 
was a clear expression of trust (or perhaps hope) that citizenship might plug growing 
perceptions of democracy and legitimacy concerns.51 While the rhetoric became increasingly 
                                                                                                                                                                      
rhetorically by AG Jacobs in Case C-168/91 Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig, Standesamt, & Landratsamt 
Calw, Ordnungsamt [1993] ECR I-1191, para. 46 of the Opinion. 
47 E.g. AC Evans, ‘European citizenship’ (1982) 45 MLR 497, TC Hartley, EEC Immigration Law, (North-
Holland, 1978); and see generally, O’Leary, n7 above. 
48 Some of the constraints that continue to check the scope of free movement rights are discussed in 
more detail below e.g. the uneasy friction that characterises the piercing by EU law of national welfare 
provision.  
49 The Spaak Report, for example, talks about regional balance and equality of treatment where it deals 
with the free movement of workers (Rapport des Chefs de Délégations aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangères, 
Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Conference, Brussels, 21 April 1956, 88-9), but there is no indication 
of any particular importance attached to persons. Faist, n3 above, 43, comments that ‘[t]he free 
movement of workers introduced by the Treaty of Rome (1957) was largely a product of Italy’s influence 
which at that time was the biggest exporter of labour to the EU’. Later, the Commission White Paper on 
Completing the Internal Market (COM (85) 310 final) did make some impassioned pleas on behalf of the 
‘people of Europe’ (see especially, 55, paras 219 and 220), but in the more abstract vein of advancing the 
Community project. 
50 Kadelbach traces key political initiatives in the 1970s which display an emerging concept of 
citizenship, including the Tindemans Report in 1975 (Bull. EC Suppl. 1-76), the 1984 Draft Treaty on 
European Union (OJ 1984 C77/53), and the work of the Adoninno Committee (Bull. EC Supp. 7/85 and 
‘A People’s Europe’, Bull. EC Supp. 2/88); see S Kadelbach, ‘Union Citizenship’, Jean Monnet Working 
Paper no. 9/03, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/030901-04.html, 7-8. 
51 On the emergence and refinement of citizenship in the Maastricht debates, see O’Leary, n7 above, 23-
30. 
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political, however, the manifestation of citizenship in real terms was grounded in free 
movement rights.52 And movement is still, for good or ill, the guts of EU citizenship.  
If we agree that the realisation of EU citizenship is traceable long before 1993, then an 
assertion that Treaty codification in and of itself marks a point at which market citizenship 
can be left behind is not an adequate explanation of things. In other words, if we accept the 
Maastricht Treaty as a significant but, nonetheless, single point on the EU citizenship 
trajectory, that line must necessarily have continued to develop too. In section A, the 
enduring market content of EU citizenship practice, having particular regard to the shaping 
frame of constitutionalism and the propelling force of cross-border movement, will be 
demonstrated empirically. Attention will also be drawn to problems that result from the 
market citizenship construct, but also to problems that citizenship cannot properly solve 
anyway. Where relevant, acknowledgement of when and how EU citizenship might go 
beyond and thus displace the descriptor of market citizenship will be made. Section B then 
addresses the political rights of EU citizenship, as strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
A. The persisting market content of EU citizenship practice 
 
Almost every substantive judgment on EU citizenship to date has related (to borrow from the 
free movement of goods) actually or potentially, directly or indirectly to free movement and 
residence rights.53 In the breakthrough citizenship case of Martínez Sala,54 the Court of Justice 
adapted the case law on service recipients – which had come gradually to decouple a direct 
linkage between personal/material scope – to apply rights developed originally for the 
economically active (material) to the situation of EU citizens (personal) who were accepted as 
being lawfully resident (through Community or national means) in a host State irrespective of 
the extent to which they currently met the economic self-sufficiency and/or medical insurance 
conditions of the Residence Directives. In that case, non-discriminatory access to a child-
raising allowance was extracted from the material Treaty scope of social advantages – 
bestowed normally on migrant workers – and transposed to the personal scope of a lawfully 
resident, non-working migrant EU citizen.   
                                                          
52 E.g. European Commission, Towards European Citizenship: The Granting of Special Rights, COM (75) 321 
final; see S O’Leary, ‘The free movement of persons and services’, in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds.), The 
Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 1999) 377, 381. 
53 The exceptions are Case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-7917 (voting rights/Gibraltar) 
and Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] ECR I-8055 (voting rights/Aruba), addressed in section B 
below. 
54 Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691. 
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Building on these foundations, citizenship is often used as an additional plank in 
economic free movement cases.55 It has also been used to justify ‘pure’ rights to movement 
and residence.56 But the legal contribution of EU citizenship has enabled much more than this 
too, in summary: (1) softening the impact of the legislative self-sufficiency/medical insurance 
limitations, especially through the invocation of proportionality;57 (2) bringing substantive 
policy issues within the scope of the Treaty;58 (3) revisiting case law which had more 
restrictive outcomes because of reliance on the economic freedoms, often to enable more 
comprehensive protection of fundamental rights;59 and even (4) guarding against potential 
inconveniences that might affect the (as yet indeterminate) exercise of free movement rights.60 
Increasingly, the humanity of the person and the added value of citizenship are engaged to 
rationalise these expansionist trends in case law on personal movement.61 The concept of 
citizenship is thus seen as bringing a – legitimate – material dimension to the interpretative 
process. Moreover, the application of citizenship almost always, though not always, resolves 
the case to the benefit of the person concerned.62  
                                                          
55 E.g. Case C-274/96 Criminal proceedings against Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637, in conjunction with 
service recipient rights. 
56 E.g. Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] ECR I-9925 
57 E.g. Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091 
(accepting less than the legislatively codified requirement of ‘comprehensive’ medical insurance); Case 
C-184/99 Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193 (non-
discriminatory entitlement to national minimum subsistence allowance for a final-year student). On the 
constitutional significance of using of proportionality in this way, see M Dougan, ‘The constitutional 
dimension to the case law on Union citizenship’ (2006) 31 ELRev 613.  
58 E.g. Case C-209/03 Bidar v London Borough of Ealing; Secretary of State for Education and Skills [2005] ECR 
I-2119, (maintenance grants for students, reversing Case 39/86 Lair v Universität Hannover [1988] ECR 
3161). 
59 E.g. compare Case C-109/01 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607, on 
Regulation 1612/68, and Case C-127/08 Metock and others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
[2008] ECR I-6241, on Directive 2004/38 (residence rights for third country national family members).  
60 E.g. Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello v Belgian State [2003] ECR I-11613 (displacing host State rules on 
registration of children’s surnames to facilitate home State conventions). 
61 E.g. E Spaventa, ‘From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (non-)economic European constitution’, (2004) 
41 CMLRev 743; RCA White, ‘Free movement, equal treatment, and citizenship of the Union’, (2005) 54 
ICLQ 885. See also, Kostakopoulou, n1 above, 265, where she describes these as ‘brave decisions that 
adjusted the dissonance between European citizenship’s constitutional design and reality, thereby 
realising the transformative possibilities of European citizenship in the process of interim integration’ 
(although, she sees this as evidence that (263) ‘European citizenship is no longer a symbolic institution 
and the mirror image of “market citizenship”’). 
62 The judgment in Case C-158/07 Förster v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep [2008] ECR I-8507 
is a rare example of where citizenship arguments did not persuade the Court to opt for the more 
favourable outcome for the individual concerned (requiring her to repay a student maintenance grant 
relating to a certain period when she did not meet host State conditions i.e. she was neither a worker nor 
resident in the host State for five years). The outcome in this case was clearly influenced by the adoption 
of Directive 2004/38 (though this measure was not yet in force at the material time); see S O’Leary ‘Equal 
treatment and EU citizens: A new chapter on cross-border educational mobility and access to student 
financial assistance’ (2009) 34 ELRev 612. 
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 But all of this still fits readily with the idea of market citizenship, especially given the 
overwhelming emphasis in citizenship case law on the potency of cross-border movement. 
So, yes, the case law on EU citizenship pushes the boundaries of EU free movement law, but 
not further than can be explained through a constitutionalised understanding of the primary 
driver: facilitating (advocating?) the exercise of movement and residence rights.63 Creeping 
towards the fringes of free movement law, however, there are interesting questions that 
stretch the market framework in more difficult and intriguing ways. The following 
paragraphs assess both the challenges that these questions already pose for EU citizenship 
and the extent to which further developments on these issues could still be accommodated 
within a constitutional market framework. It should be noted, however, that the glowing 
picture emerging through citizenship case law is not synonymous with citizenship experience 
in practice; several reports have called for urgent attention to be paid to the implementation 
of rights granted by EU law64 and political efforts are increasingly channelled towards the 
resolution of this problem.65 
  
 (i) Reverse discrimination and the purely internal rule66  
 
Despite being pushed to (and arguably beyond) its limits, free movement law clings formally 
to the rule that Treaty relevance is triggered only when an actual or potential (but not 
hypothetical) cross-border effect is identifiable. This leads to the related statements that (1) 
situations considered to be wholly internal to a Member State lie outside the scope of EU free 
movement law, and thus, outside the scope of EU citizenship;67 and (2) Member States may 
                                                          
63 Freedom of movement and residence has been described as the ‘central right of citizenship’ (see AG 
Colomer, Joined Cases C-11 and 12/06 Morgan and Bucher [2007] ECR I-9161, para. 67 of the Opinion); see 
also, para. 19 of AG Maduro’s Opinion in Case C-524/06 Huber [2008] ECR I-9705: ‘When the Court 
describes Union citizenship as the ‘fundamental status’ of nationals it is not making a political statement; it 
refers to Union citizenship as a legal concept which goes hand in hand with specific rights for Union 
citizens. Principal among them is the right to enter and live in another Member State’ (emphasis added). 
64 E.g. European Commission, Fifth Report on Citizenship of the Union, COM(2008) 85 final; European 
Commission, Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Application of Directive 2004/38, 
COM(2008) 840 final; European Citizen Action Service, Mind the Gap: Towards a Better Enforcement of 
European Citizens’ Rights of Free Movement, December 2009, available at http://www.ecas-
citizens.eu/content/view/291/1/. 
65 E.g. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council on guidance for 
better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38, COM(2009) 313 final; see also, the European 
Commission’s 2010 public consultation on citizenship (‘EU Citizens’ Rights – The way forward: 
Consultation on how to strengthen the rights stemming from Union Citizenship’), at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0007_en.htm 
66 See generally, A Tryfonidou, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law (Kluwer Law International, 2009). 
67 E.g. Garcia Avello, para. 26: ‘[c]itizenship of the Union…is not, however, intended to extend the scope 
ratione materiae of the Treaty also to internal situations which have no link with Community law’. 
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withhold from their own (non-mobile) nationals the substantive benefits that they may be 
compelled to provide to lawfully resident EU nationals (the phenomenon of reverse 
discrimination).68 The persisting reification of movement has been questioned extensively in 
the literature, from the perspective of incoherent results in the case law69 and, more recently, 
against the force of citizenship as a meaningful construct.70 Essentially, the triggering factor of 
movement is not considered to be an appropriate condition for access to the rights available 
under EU citizenship or a sufficient criterion to justify the asymmetric situations that can 
result from its application. On a purely formal analysis, the Treaty does not in fact prevent 
consideration of internal situations, at least in so far as persons are concerned. Article 26(2) 
TFEU simply outlines an area ‘without internal frontiers’, a sufficiently ambiguous reservoir 
of interpretative potential although not one drawn from to date in this context.71 Similarly, 
Article 21(1) refers to movement and residence ‘within’ – not ‘across’ – the territory of the 
States.  
 Although not writing specifically on reverse discrimination, Advocate General 
Colomer has observed that the ‘change in perspective [from free movement of persons to 
citizens] is not insignificant, because, rather than falling on the concept of movement, the focus of 
attention has shifted to the individual.’72 A change in perspective may well have occurred; 
but the Court still insists on the need to find some cross-border dimension, even a potential 
one, before the protective scope of Treaty protection is unleashed.73 Moreover, the polity-
transforming effect of reconsidering this approach must be borne in mind. It would open up a 
whole swathe of Member State policies and practices to EU scrutiny following decades of 
express insistence that such issues were not amenable to such scrutiny at all. This would seem 
all the more curious given the express delimitation of EU and Member State competences 
                                                          
68 Reunification of static EU citizens with third country national family members is the classic example 
here e.g. Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Uecker and Jacquet [1997] ECR I-3171, para. 23); and cf. 
Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification (2003 OJ L251/12) which applies to third 
country nationals lawfully resident in Member States. 
69 See N Nic Shuibhne, ‘Free movement of persons and the wholly internal rule: Time to move on?’ 
(2002) 39 CMLRev 731; A Tryfonidou, n66 above. 
70 E Spaventa, ‘Seeing the wood despite the trees? On the scope of Union citizenship and its 
constitutional effects’ (2008) 45 CMLRev 13; Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-212/06 Government of the 
French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish Community [2008] ECR I-1683, paras 112-157. 
71 E.g. Case C-378/97 Wijsenbeek [1999] ECR I-6207, in which the combined effect of Articles 14 and 18 EC 
was found not to defeat the requirement to show proof of identification at Member State frontiers; for 
more on the constitutional effects of Article 14 EC, see the Opinion of AG Cosmas, para. 37 onwards. 
72 Case C-228/07 Petersen v Arbeitsmarktservice Niederösterreich [2008] ECR I-6989, para. 28 of the Opinion 
(emphasis added). 
73 In contrast to the reasoning of AG Sharpston (cited in n. 70 above), see the judgment of the Court in 
Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish Community [2008] 
ECR I-1683, paras 32-39. 
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recently effected by the Lisbon Treaty. Irrespective of the desirability or otherwise of such a 
move, the magnitude of the change must be acknowledged, reinforcing the inherent 
connectedness of polity and citizenship evolution.  
 The debate may soon take an interesting twist, as a recent reference to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling does not hold back, directly asking the Court to rationalise the wholly 
internal rule against the counterpoint of EU citizenship. In Ruiz Zambrano, the referring 
national court has asked inter alia whether the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship in 
combination with Article 18 TFEU (ex 12 EC) ‘confer a right of residence upon a citizen of the 
Union in the territory of the Member State of which that citizen is a national, irrespective of 
whether he has previously exercised his right to move within the territory of the Member States’.74 This 
shows that lawyers somehow refuse to abandon the purely internal debate the Court’s 
responses to date. National courts and tribunals are not happy, for whatever reasons, to leave 
it there. But even if its resolution protrudes expressly into the previously protected realm of 
reverse discrimination by Member States, and even acknowledging the polity-transforming 
consequences of such a decision, it is submitted that the breadth and depth of the 
constitutional market framework codified in the EU Treaties could still accommodate the 
outcome. In other words, market citizenship already has the tools-in-waiting needed for the 
accommodation of purely internal situations, conceptually and also formally through the 
ambiguous Treaty language defining the EU internal market and the scope of the free 
movement of persons. 
 
(ii) Citizenship beyond Articles 20-25 TFEU 
 
This is a vital question that has not been properly resolved. Citizenship beyond Articles 20-25 
TFEU can mean two things: first, literally, the extent to which citizenship rights are ring-
fenced within the Treaty provisions designated expressly as outlining the rights attached to 
EU citizenship75; and, second, the extent to which a more abstract essence of citizenship can 
                                                          
74 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi, pending; see OJ 2009 C90/10 (emphasis 
added). 
75 Article 20 TFEU gathers these rights together in one provision, namely: the right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States; the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections 
to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the 
same conditions as nationals of that State; the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which 
the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the protection of the diplomatic and 
consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as the nationals of that State; and the 
right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the 
institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages (and obtain a reply in the 
same language). 
 20 
or should be applied as a global principle of Treaty interpretation, having a material impact 
on the way in which other internal market situations, for example, are determined.76 Both 
questions are based on the same premise: whether EU citizenship per se has a legally 
meaningful effect when the situation under review falls outwith the rights expressly listed in 
Article 20 TFEU – which are, after all, described as being citizenship rights ‘inter alia’. 
Moreover, the provision does not specify just that part of the Treaty. Drawing from the 
constitutional debates noted earlier, these questions explore ‘big C/small c’ citizenship and 
the relationship between the two. 
 Looking at the first question, which seeks to quantify citizenship rights, an extensive 
range of EU policy objectives – consumer and environmental protection, public health and 
education, for example, not to mention implementation of the internal market in general – has 
delivered wide-ranging outputs for EU citizens over many years. Is this body of law part of 
EU citizenship in a more direct sense? That could be one way of understanding the idea that 
the internal market is ultimately maintained for the individuals within it, representing a 
normative stage beyond the citizen-as-consumer77 and suggesting instead a market ‘for’ the 
citizens.78 While subsequent Treaty amendments have enhanced competence in many of these 
policy fields, express limitations remain in place.79 Blurring the lines between discrete 
competences and citizenship rights, however worthy the motivations, might thus exacerbate 
concerns about EU over-reach.80 
 The second question raises more of a qualitative conundrum: citizenship as a – 
meaningful – global principle of Treaty interpretation. AG Maduro, for example, has 
suggested that EU citizenship should resonate right across the application of free movement 
law.81 Following the Lisbon amendments, particular importance is attached to a range of 
                                                          
76 Shaw, n18 above, addresses similar questions by charting citizenship ‘of’ and ‘in’ the Union. 
77 In tracing the history of the European market citizen, Everson sees him/her primarily as a consumer 
(n3 above, 86-87). That construct is considerably narrower than the concept of market citizenship 
advanced here but it seems to be the dominant archetype throughout the Commission’s Single market for 
the 21st century, COM(2007) 724 final. On the concept of the consumer-citizen within the EU, see M 
Everson and C Joerges, ‘Consumer Citizenship in Postnational Constellations? (2006) EUI Working 
Paper, Law No. 2006/47, http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/6547/1/LAW%202006-47.pdf  
78 This idea permeates the tone of the 2010 Monti Report, n35 above. 
79 See especially, Articles 4 (shared competences) and 6 (supporting, coordinating and supplementary 
competences) TFEU. 
80 These arguments are developed in more detail in N Nic Shuibhne, ‘EU citizenship after Lisbon’, in D 
Ashiagbor, N Countouris, and I Lianos (eds.) The EU After Lisbon (CUP, 2011, forthcoming).  
81 See his Opinion in Joined Cases C-158/04 and C-159/04 Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos AE and Carrefour 
Marinopoulos AE v Elliniko Dimosio and Nomarchiaki Aftodioikisi Ioanninon [2006] ECR I-8135, especially 
paras 40 and 51. See also, A Tryfonidou, ‘Further steps on the road to convergence among the market 
freedoms’ (2010) 35 ELRev 36. 
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concerns that are required to inform the activities of the EU.82 Should EU citizenship be 
considered to command the same interpretative obligation? This may be an appealing notion, 
but it is not a straightforward one. Several points highlight the limitations of citizenship – 
since it is, by definition, an inherently exclusionary status – in this context. 
 First, as suggested above, an inclusive understanding of EU citizenship broadens not 
just the scope of citizenship but potentially broadens EU competence to act in Treaty-
constrained policy areas too. This might make the idea of citizenship more meaningful but it 
raises questions of polity capacity and thus legitimacy. While substantive outcomes enabled 
in this way may still fit within a market framework, the hardening of citizenship as an 
interpretative device might transcend the conditions of mobility and even nationality that 
currently characterise the ‘additionality’ of EU citizenship. This would have to induce the 
kind of political and eventually polity changes that would demand reappraisal of the market 
adjective. This seems wholly unlikely, however, given the contemporary emphasis on more 
express delimitation of EU and Member State competences. 
 Second, interpretative expansion through the use of citizenship is not a one-way 
dynamic. The approach outlined by AG Maduro, for example, could raise constraining 
nationality questions where no such questions existed previously (e.g. in respect of the 
nationality of importers/exporters of goods).83 EU citizenship may be grounded in the market, 
but that does not require that all market interests must be grounded in citizenship.  
 Third, while the Treaty provisions on citizenship (especially Article 21 TFEU) have 
been used increasingly by litigants and by the Court itself, most free movement cases are still 
resolved using the provisions on work, services, capital or establishment. The Court still 
considers the economic free movement provisions first and uses Article 21 TFEU only when 
the situation under review does not fall comfortably within the more specific Treaty 
freedoms.84 As a legal tool, citizenship is considered to be residual; turning that around 
would be another enormous interpretative shift. The Court has certainly become a more 
confident user of citizenship. In a string of recent cases, however – Vatsouras, Teixeira and 
Ibrahim – the rights of workers under Article 45 TEFU were used to achieve outcomes that 
were not possible under the EU citizenship framework because of the limitations prescribed 
by Directive 2004/38, even though the exercise of work in all three cases was either 
                                                          
82 See Title II TFEU (‘Provisions having general application’) and, in particular, Articles 8-12. 
83 See further, P Oliver and S Enchelmaier, ‘Free movement of goods: Recent developments in the case 
law’, (2007) 44 CMLRev 649, 677. 
84 See further, N. Nic Shuibhne, ‘Case comment on Schwarz, Commission v Germany, and Morgan and 
Bucher’ (2008) 45 CMLRev 771, 774-775. 
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prospective (Vatsouras) or tangential (Ibrahim and Teixeira).85 Even if the Court subconsciously 
reasoned these judgments by invoking of citizenship as a global principle of Treaty 
interpretation, it was at pains to emphasise that it was not doing so. But for present purposes: 
either way, whether derived through work or citizenship, the substantive rights developed in 
all of these cases nonetheless fit squarely within a market citizenship paradigm. 
 In conclusion, it was argued in this section that, first, there is ample space in the 
market citizen paradigm for the accommodation of further citizenship developments. For 
example, the legal framework of the market designed by the EU Treaty could, in formal terms 
at least, accommodate a change in approach to questions of reverse discrimination. Second, as 
regards the effecting of citizenship rights beyond the confines of Articles 18-25 TFEU, the 
normative authority of citizenship as a global interpretative mechanism is already evidenced 
in free movement law, but pushing for more widespread invocation of this could present 
considerable challenges from the perspectives of EU competence and legitimacy. At the 
margins of capacity, some forms of developing EU citizenship would indeed strain the 
constitutional market framework, but would also induce shifts in institutional and political 
structures that would in turn demand re-imagination of the EU as a polity in any event. This 
brings us to consider, finally, how the political dimension of citizenship relates to all of this. 
 
B. The market shaping of (even) EU political rights 
 
European integration forces us to rethink constitutional legal theory … It assumes a 
constitution, without a traditional political community defined and presupposed by 
that constitution; or it requires a new form of political community.86  
 
Political rights are a defining feature of any citizenship. The EU Treaty specifies a number of 
political rights for EU citizens, summarised in Article 20 TFEU and elaborated on in Articles 
22 (municipal and European parliament elections), 23 (diplomatic or consular protection in a 
third country) and 24 (petitioning the European Parliament, applying to the Ombudsman, 
writing to/receiving a reply from EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies in any language 
                                                          
85 Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze v Arbeitsgemeinschaft (ARGE) Nürnberg 900, 
judgment of 4 April 2009, not yet reported (using Article 45 TFEU to accommodate social benefits for 
job-seekers, thereby circumventing restrictions set down in Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38); Case C-
480/08 Teixeira and  Case C-310/08 Ibrahim, both delivered on 23 February 2010, not yet reported (using 
Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 to establish rights of residence in a host State for the primary carers of 
children of (former) migrant workers still in host State education, notwithstanding the fact that neither 
applicant satisfied the economic self-sufficiency conditions required for EU citizens in Directive 
2004/38). 
86 Maduro, n36 above, 175. 
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specified in Article 55(1) TEU) TFEU.  These provisions are now underpinned by Article 10(3) 
TEU, which confirms inter alia the right of every EU citizen ‘to participate in the democratic 
life of the Union’.  
 Just as we have seen more generally throughout this article, discussion of the political 
rights attached to EU citizenship tends to be differentiated from the market origins, at least, of 
the status. But is is important, for the purposes of the present article, to remember three 
contextual points in this regard. First, the rights to petition the European Parliament and 
apply to the European Ombudsman are extended, in Articles 227 and 228 TFEU, to all natural 
and legal persons lawfully resident in an EU Member State. Similarly, natural or legal persons 
resident in an EU Member State may also avail of any of the Treaty languages when 
petitioning the Parliament or applying to the Ombudsman. It is also unlikely that different 
language rules will apply to EU citizens on the one hand and those lawfully resident in an EU 
State on the other regarding communications with EU bodies and agencies (the specifics of 
which are detailed in the relevant founding decisions). This means that the new citizens’ 
initiative, access to diplomatic or consular protection of any Member State when in a third 
country, and rights to vote in/stand for municipal and European Parliament elections are the 
only ‘pure’ EU citizenship political rights. 
 Second, it is simply too soon to ascertain the contribution to EU citizenship offered by 
two of those three remaining rights. The newly constituted citizens’ initiative provides a 
mechanism for EU citizens to engage directly with EU law-making. Cross-referencing to 
Article 11(4) TFEU,87 the new first paragraph of Article 24 TFEU empowers the Council and 
European Parliament to adopt regulations determining ‘the procedures and conditions 
required for a citizens’ initiative…including the minimum number of Member States from 
which such citizens must come’.88 But it is impossible to predict how effective or otherwise 
this new opportunity will prove to be. The success of the citizens’ initiative rests with the 
citizens themselves, appropriately enough, but assuming that States as well as the EU 
institutions engage with ensuring both access to and information about the procedure, about 
what it is for, and how it works. That process may in itself advance information and better 
understanding about just what it is that the EU can – and, conversely, cannot – do. It will also 
be interesting to observe whether a genuinely transnational political community emerges 
                                                          
87 ‘Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States may 
take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit 
any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for 
the purpose of implementing the Treaties’. 
88 Recalling the proviso in Article 11(4) TEU that these one million citizens must be nationals of a 
‘significant’ number of Member States. 
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through this mechanism, or if more organised interests simply hijack the process for their 
own ends. Access to diplomatic or consular protection is also an interesting novelty and a 
good example of creative, bottom-up possibilities that might in the longer term generate a 
real connection (even a feeling of belonging) to the EU per se as distinct from its component 
States.89 It is rather like free movement rights, in that it will not be claimed by many – but it 
might, also like free movement rights, make a profound difference for the individual(s) 
concerned where it does need to be invoked.  
 Electoral rights, the third category of ‘pure’ political citizenship rights, have 
considerably wider impact. Following direct elections to the European Parliament for the first 
time in 1979, the Commission issued a proposal in 1988 on voting in municipal elections.90 
Progress on this was ultimately deferred in view of preparatory work on the realisation of 
these rights instead through what was to become the TEU. But that Treaty’s codification of 
electoral rights in the context of residence in another Member State is framed in non-
discrimination and thus amplified the continuing resonance of the constitutional and the 
market.91 In his joint Opinion in Spain v UK and Eman and Sevinger, Advocate General Tizzano 
suggested the existence of a general right to vote for EU citizens, quite apart from the context 
of residence in another State, reasoning that Article 22(2) TFEU ‘takes it for granted that the 
right in question is available to citizens of the Union’ and drawing also from ‘the principles of 
democracy on which the Union is based’.92 This is supported by scholarship;93 but the Court 
has not (yet) confirmed it. That provides, for now at least, the third limitation on discussion of 
political EU citizenship rights. It is worth noting, however, that the striking reach of non-
discrimination in Eman and Sevinger, arguably a wholly internal case, casts the judgment as all 
the more remarkable, and makes it a potential catalyst in waiting should the Court decide to 
continue to pierce the shield of internal State business.94  
                                                          
89 See Decision 95/553/EC of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting 
within the Council of 19 December 1995 regarding protection for citizens of the European Union by 
diplomatic and consular representations, OJ 1995 L314/73; the Commission has identified this issue as a 
priority for further action, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/citizenship/diplomatic/policies_citizenship_diplomatic_en.htm 
90 OJ 1988 C246/3. 
91 Some commentators similarly sited political rights in the movement corner of EU citizenship: e.g. V. 
Lippolis, ‘European citizenship: What it is and what it could be’, in M. La Torre (ed.), European 
Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 317, 321-322. 
92 Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] ECR I-8055, Opinion of AG Tizzano, paras 67-69. 
93 E.g. Shaw, n18 above.  
94 See further, D Kochenov, ‘Free movement and participation in the parliamentary elections in the 
Member State of nationality: An ignored link?’ (2009) 16 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law 197 at 214-215. The recent decision in Rottmann on the impact of EU citizenship (and, more 
specifically, a required proportionality assessment) on State competence to determine the loss and 
acquisition of nationality is another example of a judgment that may yet challenge apparently reserved 
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 Thus, bearing in mind the much shorter evolutionary trajectory of the political 
citizenship rights that we do have in the EU context, this section focuses instead on a critical 
gap. As early as 1975, the Commission asserted that ‘complete assimilation with nationals as 
regards political rights is desirable in the long term from the point of view of a European 
Union’.95 This ambition highlights arguably the most problematic gap in EU citizenship from 
political, constitutional and market perspectives i.e. voting rights in national elections for EU 
citizens who reside in a State other than their home State (who cannot avail of nationally 
granted external voting rights, or who do not reside in a host State benefiting from a bilateral 
voting arrangement, such as that between Ireland and the UK). Given the relationship of 
political dependence between the EU polity and its State components, and the significance of 
this for polity legitimacy discussed in part II, this gap, as Everson has observed, means that 
‘while this citizen is “attached” to two forms of society, it is master of neither’.96 Although 
Everson criticises this from the perspective of the citizen being ‘denied entry to the body 
politic which ultimately determines the course of the nation’, the argument is extended here 
to reflect more the exclusion of EU citizens from contributing to host State policy on EU 
matters through the crucial participation of national governments and parliaments in EU 
decision-making –offending both the spirit and substance of constitutional market citizenship 
and emptying the new statements in Article 10 TEU of real meaning. It is ironic that mobile 
citizens are protected so strongly in many respects yet excluded so decisively from 
participation in the multi-level political mosaic of EU decision-making. 
 Kochenov provides a persuasive argument in favour of enfranchisement, reviewing 
Treaty, case law and coordinated national prospects for resolving this ‘acute problem in 
European law’.97 He also reminds us that, even leaving aside valid normative arguments 
about exclusion from participation, case law on EU citizenship is characterised by intense 
distaste for obstacles that not only prevent but also make more difficult, discourage, deter or 
disadvantage the exercise or potential exercise of free movement. Loss of voting rights in 
national parliamentary elections is surely a profound example of such disadvantage. It is also 
one of the few aspects of EU citizenship that citizens themselves have actively questioned.98 
Moreover, Shaw suggests that the social welfare inclusion effected by Directive 2004/38 and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
State competences in more acute ways (Case C-135/08 Rottman, judgment of 2 March 2010, not yet 
reported). 
95 European Commission, Towards European Citizenship: The Granting of Special Rights, COM(75) 321 final, 
para. 3.1. 
96 Everson, n4 above, 77. 
97 See again, Kochenov, n94 above.  
98 J Shaw, ‘EU citizenship and political rights in an evolving European Union’ (2007) 75 Fordham Law 
Review 2549 at 2558-2559. 
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host State obligations of permanent residence sit at odds with the absence of any impact on 
national voting rights. The Lisbon Treaty has not (nor would the Constitution have) changed 
this.99 Thus, although Article 25 TFEU enables the granting of additional citizenship rights 
outwith a full-blown Treaty reform process, the silence from recent IGCs indicates that the 
Members States are not contemplating this step in any serious way.  
There is no doubt that implementing a system that enables voting in national 
elections for migrant EU citizens would demand the careful working out of a range of 
conditions and integration thresholds, and its normative basis would probably need roots in 
both home State exportability and host State responsibility. This shares clear parallels with 
the evolution of enhanced host State welfare provision for the non-economically self-
sufficient: which has taken time, but is coming gradually to pass. National elections bear on 
even more sensitive molecules of sovereignty that social solidarity, but the end-game here is 
even more critical for the long-term health of the EU as a polity. There may be real 
constitutional difficulties about the extension of voting rights to non-nationals in some 
Member States, and so we might not have a perfect or even complete solution.100 As we saw 
in a different context above, though, perhaps the ethos if not the letter of European Court of 
Human Rights jurisprudence could be drawn from here too in terms of the responsibility that 
States must accept when shaping the polities that they design. 
‘Even’ market citizenship means that we should not be mollified or misled by ‘a 
modicum of political participation rights associated with the decision-making processes 
needed to make the market idea work’.101 The constitutional casing around the EU market 
itself demands more. In his exploration of atypical forms of democratic deliberation and 
participation, Gerstenberg touches on a movement-as-identity idea, arguing that: 
… freedom of movement enables citizens to trigger off, on the European level itself, a 
process of constitutional justification as to how to balance autonomy and equality. 
What emerges is an argument-theoretical constellation in which freedom of 
movement as a fundamental individual right is not merely a “trump” (to be deployed 
by economic actors to the effect of broadening the realm of private autonomy), but a 
device of deliberate inclusion….In this sense, freedom of movement, in the expansive 
interpretation given to it by the Court of Justice, operates not merely as a “negative” 
right, but acquires the meaning of a “positive” right to participation in constitutional 
deliberation.102  
 
                                                          
99 Ibid., 2553. For an overview of proposals developing EU citizenship that did/did not find their way 
into the Constitutional Treaty (OJ 2004 C310/1), see Kostakopoulou, n1 above, 261-263. 
100 Ibid., 2574-2577. 
101 J Shaw, ‘Citizenship of the union: Towards post-national membership?’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 
no. 6/97, at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-06-.html, 8. 
102 Gerstenberg, n22 above, 181-182.  
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So it is not that constructs of community or identity or participation are irrelevant to the 
thesis of market citizenship; but instead, that their manifestation can differ from conventional 
(national) channels. EU citizenship challenges us to contemplate more imaginatively what 
type of political strength we need to add at the EU level. Della Scala and Wiener oscillate 
between movement-as-identity (‘a new type of belongingness to the EU has been created, 
based on everyday practices of groups of citizens’) and identity-as-identity (‘[b]y crossing 
borders, creating burgundy coloured passports, sharing new voting practices in European 
and municipal elections, residing in other member states than that of their nationality, and 
experiencing a variety of “European” cultures these groups have given substance to a notion 
of Europeanness’) conceptions of citizenship.103  
Everson argued in 1995 that the ‘self-interest’ of the instrumentalist market citizen 
did not establish a ‘general allegiance to the Communities’.104 But this does not mean that it 
can not. Ironically, the functional market gains that EU citizens participate in on a frequent 
basis are perhaps the least well-sold aspects of the continuing EU integration project. Most 
people are unaware of the internal market happening all around them. Neither does this 
mean that EU institutions can be immune from high political and democratic standards. But it 
does mean that there is a more limited political range for something like the EU, as currently 
constituted, to manipulate. This in turn allows transnational identity to evolve in a more 
functional than emotional way.105 Functional citizenship manifests real participation in the 
polity of which the citizens are – and might eventually feel that they are – members. The 
Lisbon-effected role of national parliaments in assessing the adherence of EU legislative 
proposals to subsidiarity is one new way through which this might become more visible. 
Similarly, the impact in reality of the citizens’ initiative should be carefully tracked. When we 
emphasise only the attachment aspects of social and political membership, we underplay 
valuable market citizenship cards and walk ourselves further into a belonging deficit that is 
much more difficult to unpick. The European anthem cannot be shoved down the throats of 
EU citizens. They will respond to it or they won’t, and that is entirely their prerogative. It also 
brings back the point about the extent to which the States can contribute some of the missing 
political creed to the EU (even at a basic level if they, frankly, behave better and own up to 
the consensual character of their actions when they engage with their supranational guises 
instead of coming home to stoke populism by ‘blaming Brussels’). 
                                                          
103 Della Scala and Wiener, n25 above, 16. 
104 Everson, n4 above, 85. 
105 For a contrary view, see Everson, n4 above, 88-90. 
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 It is not just market-as-identity then, or even movement-as-identity. It is more 
market-participation as identity. For now, as discussed, this means cross-border market 
participation. The organic pace of things must also be accommodated: ‘[p]ut crudely: it is far 
from clear that Polish taxpayers would be prepared to pay for the unemployment benefits of 
French citizens living in France; or that Irish taxpayers would be happy to fund healthcare for 
Greek nationals residing in Greece.’106 Turn that around, though, and the prospect of speedier 
or more effective hospital treatment in another State is going to seem far more appealing to 
most EU citizens. The inherent give/take link between both situations needs to be highlighted. 
A methodology centred only on individual state welfare capacity fails to take seriously the 
inherently shared aspects of the contemporary reality of social provision But against the 
backdrop of the economic crisis and the palpable current of national protectionism in 
associated public debate, both conceptual and actual advances in building this kind of 
transnational solidarity will be challenging, at best.107 
 The degree to which we may or may not commit to transnational social solidarity 
exemplifies questions of political identity and their intersection with the framework of the 
constitutional market. Advocate General Maduro captured the evolving nature of solidarity 
in his remark that ‘[c]itizenship of the Union must encourage Member States to no longer 
conceive of the legitimate link of integration only within the narrow bounds of the national 
community, but also within the wider context of the society of peoples of the Union.108 This 
‘society of peoples of the Union’ is an extremely complicated and uneven space, acutely 
demonstrated by the conflict between social dumping and social protection in Laval. The 
Court of Justice was strongly criticised for the crudity of its market-based reasoning.109 But it 
is important to remember that the Court’s construction of things is not the only solution 
possible under market reasoning. In his 2010 report, Monti emphasised that the legal changes 
effected by the Lisbon Treaty110 can ensure that ‘the concerns raised by the trade unions 
                                                          
106 M Dougan and E Spaventa, ‘“Wish you weren’t here…” New models of social solidarity in the 
European Union’, in M Dougan and E Spavanta (eds.) Social Welfare and EU Law (Hart Publishing, 2005) 
181 at 188. 
107 For analysis of the emerging shape of transnational solidarity, see the essays in M Ross and Y 
Borgmann-Prebil (eds.) Promoting Solidarity in the European Union (OUP, 2010); starting from the premise 
of national solidarity, A Somek, ‘Solidarity decomposed: Being and time in European citizenship’ (2007) 
32 ELRev 787. 
108 Case C-499/06 Nerkowska [2008] ECR I-3993, para. 23 of the Opinion. 
109 E.g. C Barnard ‘Social dumping or dumping socialism’ (2008) 67 CLJ 262; S Deakin ‘Regulatory 
competition after Laval’ (2007-2008) 10 CYELS 581; P Syrpis and T Novitz ‘Economic and social rights in 
conflict: political and judicial approaches to their reconciliation’ (2008) 33 ELRev 411. 
110 Pointing here to codification of the ‘social market economy’ objective in Article 3(3) TEU and the 
legally binding quality conferred on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by Article 6(1) TEU. 
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should hopefully find an adequate response’.111 The Court of Justice has to take these express 
instructions on board; and the Member States too need to take responsibility for ensuring that 
the Posted Workers Directive is either properly implemented in national law and/or amended 
if it is agreed that its present orientation does not capture intended objectives of social 
protection.112 Otherwise, social exclusion creeps in as yet another exclusionary facet of EU 
citizenship on top of nationality and non-mobility. And the important point for present 
purposes is that these aspects of Laval were not demanded by the EU market, or by its 
citizenship. 
 In his Opinion in Petersen, Advocate General Colomer captured the complexity of 
which market citizenship is fully capable, though he did not himself use this term: 
The Court has gone beyond [the] State perspective and incorporated into the acquis 
communautaire an approach more in keeping with the nature of citizenship of the 
Union. [T]he importance of the responsibilities and obligations of States of origin is 
noticeably waning in favour of the responsibilities and obligations of host States. 
Therefore…even though it may become a burden on public funds, States must 
provide the same services to all citizens of the Union, irrespective of their nationality 
and residence, if they prove that they carry out activities comparable to those carried 
out by persons who do have a link with the political community of that State. That 
principle is strengthened where a citizen of the Union proves that he is not a financial 
burden on the host State, regardless of his source of income or the method used to 
obtain citizenship. It is, therefore, the notion of belonging in a material sense, aside 
from any administrative requirements, which justifies the inclusion of citizens of the 
Union in the political community. When the ties of identity with a single State are 
broken so that they may be shared with others, a connection is woven in a wider 
sphere. As a result, the notion of European belonging is created, which the Treaties 
seek to strengthen … Accordingly, the emergence of fundamental rights, on the one 
hand, and the link with the State of which the individual concerned effectively is 
part, on the other, imbue the case-law with a constitutional dimension. That serves to 
protect the status of the free citizen in the democratic sphere of the Union, an aspect 
which is enshrined in the reality of a Union governed by the rule of law in which 
legal provisions, especially the ones in the Treaties, guarantee individual freedom 
and democratic equality. 113 
 
There is a danger of reductionism in looking to less orthodox solutions to gloss over real 
structural defects. But there is also a danger in not looking to them and so finding the EU 
eternally flawed when evaluated against familiar but ultimately inappropriate comparators. 
Some of the ideas contained in the extract above need to be worked out in more detail and 
                                                          
111 Monti, n35 above, p. 70. The ‘role of the social partners’ and ‘diversity of national systems’ are also 
given express recognition in Article 152 TFEU. 
112 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (OJ 1997 L18/1); see S Sciarra 
‘Viking and Laval: Collective labour rights and market freedoms in the enlarged EU’ (2007-2008) 10 
CYELS 563 at 578-9. 
113 Petersen, paras 30-32 of the Opinion (internal references omitted). 
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rationalised more fully. But it uses, at least, a language of political membership and belonging 
that is arguably more suited to the EU than the way in which we address similar ideas in the 
context of States. It also suggests that redressing the political imbalance of the EU and its 





This article has argued that our understanding of market citizenship must be shaped by the 
particular market to which the relationship of citizenship is attached. The idea of the EU as 
accommodating a constitutional market enables us to accommodate a complex, rights-driven 
profile of EU market citizenship. Looking at the trajectory of citizenship in this way means 
that codification of citizenship rights in the Treaty marks just one step in a functional lineage 
of constitutionally enhanced free movement rights. The article thus rejects the thesis that 
market citizenship is a construct of the distant past. Rather, market citizenship continues to 
capture and enable both material and membership elements of EU citizenship and the 
framework of EU market citizenship holds potential also for further development.114 The 
argument builds on the intricate links between the EU and its Member States, as well as 
between their respective and complementary citizenships. It tries to avoid over-Stating our 
expectations of EU citizenship and highlights instead what transnational citizenship actually 
does and can deliver in value-added terms. By reviving market-rooted questions about the 
EU as a polity and its developing version of citizenship, the article simply asks that we reflect 
on questions that we are more likely to write off just a little too quickly. A thesis of market 
citizenship does not mean that we should stop striving for the evolution or even 
transformation of EU citizenship. The current incarnation of the market citizen is neither a 
perfect nor definitive one and market citizenship may or may not prove to be a phase of 
transition. Moreover, the argument developed here does not seek to dismiss or displace the 
wealth of normative thinking, contested as it is, that now conceptualises EU citizenship in 
                                                          
114 Looking at the dormant side of EU citizenship, a credible list of citizenship duties could be articulated 
even by re-conceptualising existing rules and practices. Indirect examples could include funding of the 
EU through the payment of different forms of taxation. Some direct examples can be distilled from free 
movement law (e.g. the Court has confirmed that the benefits of free movement law should not be 
abused (Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I-1459, freedom of establishment; Case C-109/01 Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607, free movement of workers); arguably, then, a 
duty not to abuse free movement law could be inferred). The evolving competences of the Union also 
offer new ideas about the obligations as much as rights of EU citizens; see e.g. A Ryall, ‘Communicating 
European environmental citizenship’, draft paper presented at the 2010 UACES Conference, available at 
http://www.uaces.org/pdf/papers/1002/Ryall.pdf 
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creative and challenging ways. Rather, it questions the extent to which we are actually ‘there 
yet’ in empirical terms.  
Defending the market framework is intended also as a device for arguing a much 
broader point i.e. that trying to force the EU to run before it can walk will simply lead to 
inevitable and unhelpful disappointment and a fated feeling of failure. We need to remember 
just how new this polity, its structures, institutions and processes actually are. Thinking in 
parallel terms about the history of state-based citizenship, the EU and its citizenship are 
newborns. In comparative terms, both the polity and its citizenship have, in fact, already 
come an incredibly long way. 
 
